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CONFLICTS AND DEPENDENT SOVEREIGNS 
INCORPORATING INDIAN TRIBES INTO A CONFLICTS 
COURSE 
Wendy Collins Perdue· 
SEVERAL years ago, the AALS Sect10n on Conflict of Laws did a program on conflicts mvolvmg Native Amencan tribal law. That program highlighted 
that m additiOn to the federal and state governments, there IS a third category of 
governmental entity m this county, I.e., Indian Tribes, and these entities provide a 
fascmatmg arena m whtch to explore conflicts Issues. 
I use matenals on Indian Tribes at the end of my course as a vehicle for 
exammmg the mterrelatwns among choice of law, JUnsdictiOn, and recogmtwn of 
JUdgments. I give students about thirty pages of cases and notes that explore the 
contours of state, tribal, and federal authonty 1 My goal IS not to make students 
experts m Indian law Instead, I use the matenal as a vehicle to get students to 
reexamme assumptiOns about the nature of sovereignty and the role of chOice of 
law, JUnsdictton, and recogmtton of JUdgments as devices for recogmzmg and 
allocatmg governmental authonty 
The matenals begm with a sectiOn onJunsdictwnallimtts on states and Tribes.2 
This matenal highlights that with respect to conflicts mvolvmg Indian Tribes, the 
pnmary device for allocatmg authority IS JUnsdictiOn rather than choice oflaw The 
first case, Williams v. Lee,3 IS a stmple contract actiOn brought m state court by a 
non-Indian plamtiff agamst an Indian husband and wife allegmg failure to pay for 
goods purchased on the ReservatiOn at plamt1ffs store.4 The Supreme Court held 
that the state courts had no Junsdichon to hear this dispute.5 The case provides a 
bnef history of the relatiOnship among Tribes, states, and the federal government 
and notes that "Congress has acted consistently upon the assumption that the States 
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservatton."6 The opmton 
ends w1th the conclusiOn that "[t]here can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of 
state JUnsdictiOn here would undermme the authonty of the tribal courts over 
ReservatiOn affairs and hence would mfnnge on the nght of the Indians to govern 
themselves."7 
In the class discussiOn, I start With the Court's concern about preservmg tribal 
self-governance and ask students to articulate why state court JUnsdictiOn would 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown UmvefSity Law Center. B.A. 1975, Wellesely College; J.D. 
1978, Duke Umvers1ty 
I. The matenals described are mcluded m a casebook manuscnpt wntten by th1s author, 
Symeon Symeomdes, and Arthur von Mehren. 
2. A helpful article IS Frank Pommershe1m, The Crucible o[Sovere1gnty: Analyzmg Issues of 
Tribal Jumdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV 329 ( 1989). 
3. 358 u.s. 217 (1959). 
4. /d. at 217-18. 
5. /d. at 222-23. 
6. !d. at 220. 
7 /d. at 223. 
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mfnnge on self-governance.8 In the mterstate context, respect for another state's 
self-governance 1s addressed pnmarily through chotce of law, not JUnsdictton.9 
Indeed attempts by states to use JUnsdictiOn as the dev1ce for allocatmg authonty 
are at least somettmes unconstttuttonal. 10 Would chmce of law would be an 
adequate way to preserve tribal self-governance? If JUnsdictwnal dismissals are 
necessary to preserve tribal self-governance, are they also necessary m the mterstate 
context? These questlon provtde an opportunity to reconstder cases such as 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George 11 and Cnder v. Zurzch Insurance 
Co. 12 
The relattonshtp between JUnsdictton and self-governance ts explored further m 
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante. 13 Thts case grew out of an automobile 
acctdent on a reservation mvolvmg an Indian employee of a Montana corporatton 
domg bus mess on the reservatton. 14 The Indian plamtiff sued the corporatwn and 
tts msurer m tribal court. 15 The msurance company moved unsuccessfully to 
dismtss for lack of JUnsdictwn.'6 It then filed a declaratory JUdgment actton m 
federal court, seekmg a declaratiOn that 1t had no duty to defend the sutt m tribal 
court because the acctdent was outstde the scope of the policy 17 The Supreme 
Court held that although the federal sutt should not have been dismissed for lack of 
subJect matter JUrtsdictiOn, the distnct court could properly constder whether to stay 
the federal actton or dismiss on grounds analogous to abstentiOn. 18 The Court 
reiterated the Importance of tribal JUdictal JUnsdictton and stressed that 
"[p ]romotwn of tribal self-government and self-determmatlon require[] that the 
Tribal Court have 'the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for 
the challenge' to 1ts Junsdictwn."19 
8. The basic pattern m Williams should be a familiar one to conflicts students-a plamtifffrom 
one state, conduct m and a defendant from another state. Cipolla v. Shaposlw IS a well-known tort case 
that fits th1s pattern. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856-57 (Pa. 1970) (applymg Delaware law 
rather than Pennsylvania law where Pennsylvania plamtiff brought smt for damages as a result of 
automobile accident that occurred m Delaware mvolvmg a Delaware resident). 
9 State courts must, of course, have personal Junsdictwn. However, the Supreme Court 
currently views personal JUnsdictiOn as protectmg the liberty of defendants rather than protectmg the 
sovereignty of sister states. See Insurance Corp. oflr .. Ltd. v. Compagme des Bauxites de Gumee, 456 
U.S. 694, 702-03 & n.lO (1982). In earlier cases, the Court had suggested a different approach and 
Implied that the purpose of personal JUrtsdictiOn was to prevent mtrus1ons mto the sovereignty of other 
states. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (finding personal 
JUnsdictwn IS "an mstrument ofmterstate federalism"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) 
("The authontv of every tribunal IS necessarily restricted by the temtonallim1ts of the State m wh1ch 
1t IS established."). One can use the Indian matenals as an occasiOn to reconsider the Court's current 
approach. 
10. See Cnder v. Zunch Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1965); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. 
v George, 233 U.S. 354, 359-61 (1914). 
II. 233 U.S. 354 (1914). 
12. 380 u.s. 39 (1965). 
13. 480 u.s. 9 (1987). 
14. !d. at ll. 
15. !d. 
16. !d. at 12. 
17 !d. at 13. 
18. !d. at 16 n.8, 20 n.l4. 
19. !d. at 15-16 (quotmg NatiOnal Farmers Umon Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 
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Justice Stevens dissented and h1s argument prov1des a good startmg pomt for the 
discussiOn. Just1ce Stevens noted that "[i]t 1s not unusual for a state court and a 
federal court to have concurrent JUnsdictlon over the same dispute."20 He 
concluded, "I see no reason why tribal courts should rece1ve more deference on the 
ments than state courts."21 I ask students to cons1der the extent to wh1ch tribal 
courts do rece1ve "more deference" and whether there are reasons to treat states and 
tribes differently m th1s regard. 
After explormg the scope oftribaiJudic!aiJunsdictwn, the matenals exam me the 
scope of tribal legislative JUnsdictwn. In Montana v Umted States,22 the Court 
held that the Crow Tribe could not regulate huntmg and fishmg by non-members 
of the Tribe on land owned by non-members but located ms1de the reservatwn. 23 
The Court concluded that "the general pnnc1ples of retamed mherent sovere1gnty" 
did apply m th1s case because "regulatiOn of huntmg and fishmg by nonmembers 
of a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relat10nsh1p to tribal 
self-government or mtemal relat10ns."24 The case thus ra1ses mterestmg questwns 
about the centrality of land to sovere1gnty 
The final1ssue mcluded m the matenals IS recogmt10n of tribal court judgments. 
Some commentators have argued that a tribal court 1s a court of a "Temtory or 
PossessiOn" w1thm the meamng of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and therefore 1ts JUdgments 
are ent1tled to full fa1th and credit.25 Others have disagreed26 and the caselaw on 
this Issue 1s lim1tedY Regardless of how the current sectwn 1738 IS mterpreted, 
Congress could amend that statute to bnng tribal courts withm the statute's amb1t. 
Would th1s be a good 1dea? Even for those who support mcreased tribal autonomy 
th1s quest1on 1s not as easy as 1t m1ght appear As Professor Vetter has explamed: 
A conclusiOn that section 1738 mcludes Indian tribes must be based on the proposition 
that they are part of the Umted States' federal polity, while Indian self-determmatwn 
(1985)). The Court's deference to tribal courts m c1vil litigation does not extend to cnmmal 
JUnsdictlon. In Oliphant v. Suquamzsh Indian Tribe, the Court held that the Suquamish Tribe did not 
have cnmmal JUnsdiction over a non-Indian for conduct that occurred on the tribe's reservatiOn. 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,212 (1978). 
20. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurnng m part and dissentmg m part). 
21. /d. 
22. 450 u.s. 544 (1981). 
23. /d. at 566. 
24. /d. at 564-65. 
25. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Umon, 26 WILLAMETfE L. REv 
841,908 (1990). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). 
26. See Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundarres: 
FuJI Faith and Credit, Comzty, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV 589, 673 (1990); 
William V Vetter, OfTribal Courts and "Territorzes" Is FuJI Faith and Credit Requzred? 23 CAL. 
W L. REv 219, 269 (1987). 
27 Compare Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895,901 (Idaho 1982) (holding that section 1738 
applies to judgments of tribal courts), and Jim v CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M. 
1975) (holding that section 1738 applies to tribal law), with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 
694 (Anz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that sectwn 1738 does not apply to tribal courts). See generaJ/y 
Fred Ragsdale, Problems zn the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv 
133 (1977) (summariZing the history ofthe Full Faith and Credit Clause and the arguments for and 
agrunst extending 1t to Indian Tribes). 
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IS based on the propositiOn that they are not a part of that polity In addition, the 
reciprocity reqmred by sectiOn 1738 would tend to limit tribal flexibility which IS an 
Important part of the concept of self-deterrnmat10n and which may be needed to 
adequatelv protect the tribes' mterests or those of Its members.28 
In order to tie all of the Issues together, I end the matenal With the followmg 
discussion problem: 
The native populatiOn of the Hawaiian Islands has not been recogmzed by the 
federal government as an Indian tribe. There IS a growmg "sovereignty movement" 
among this native population. 
Assume that some autonomy or self-governance IS to be granted to thts group. 
Consider what mechanisms might be used to recogn1ze that autonomy Could they be 
granted some type of sovere1gn status Without control over a delineated portiOn of 
land? If land IS necessary would 1t matter whether any or all of the governed 
populatiOn lived on that land? Would It be suffic1ent that the group owned an office 
building m Honolulu? 
If the native group IS granted some form of autonomy short of complete 
mternatwnal mdependence, It will be necessary to allocate authonty among the native 
group, the state and the federal governments. Should the pnmary allocatwnal 
mechan1sm be choice of law, JUrisdictiOnal restrictiOns, or a combmat1on of both? Are 
there cultural or social factors that may mfluence your analysis of any of these 
ISSUes?29 
I start the discussiOn by askmg whether the native populatiOn must have land m 
order to be recogmzed as a sovereign or governmental entity Is It mconceiVable 
to recogmze a separate government when there IS no discrete terntory that the 
government controls? I then tum the discussiOn to the relative ments of choice of 
law JUrisdiction and recogmtwn of Judgments as allocatlve devices. Finally I ask 
students the followmg: to the extent they would use choice of law, what choice of 
law methodology would they recommend? As representatives of the mdigenous 
populatiOn, IS there a methodology that they would consider more respectful of 
tribal sovereignty? Would they want both the tribe and the State of Hawaii to use 
the same choice of law methodology? 
Students' reactiOn to the Indian matenal and discussiOn problem has been very 
positiVe. They find It an mterestmg context m which to review and reexamme the 
bas1c elements of the course. The matenal can also provide an occasiOn to question 
basic assumptions about the allocation of power among governmental umts w1thm 
our federal system.3° Finally for some students this IS the only course m law school 
m wh1ch they consider the scope of tribal authonty and the relatiOnship between 
28. Vetter, supra note 26, at 269. 
29. See generally Neil M. Levy Nat1ve Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CAL. L. REv 848 (1975); 
Ellen Nakashtma, Native Hawaiians Consider Askmgfor The1r Islands Back, WASH. POST, Aug. 27 
1996, at AI. 
30. Professor Judith Resnik has argued on stmilar grounds for greater mcluswn oflndian matenal 
m the standard Federal Courts course. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovere1gns: Indian Tribes, 
States, and the Fede,.al Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv 671, 701-42 (1989). 
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tribes, states, and the federal government. Of course, many professors may 
conclude that as mterestmg as the subject may be, they JUSt don't have the extra 
class to devote to 1t. There are no easy solutions to th1s dilemma. However, I have 
found that th1s nch matenal offers enough that 1t IS worth mcluding even at the cost 
of compressmg slightly some of the more traditional conflicts top1cs. 
